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abstract:  For the past 14 years, Saudi Arabia has been struggling to reduce its dependence on foreign 
labour and increase the participation of Saudi nationals in the private sector. Policies of Saudization 
adopted in the last twenty years have not achieved what they set out to do, falling far short in com-
bating unemployment, accommodating the increasing numbers of Saudi job seekers, and decreasing 
dependence on foreign labour. This explanatory note discusses the latest Saudization scheme “Nitaqat” 
and evaluates it as a national policy. The note addresses three dimensions: Output of the programme, 
mainly planned and implemented activities; Outcome or what the policy achieved (intermediate policy 
results); and finally, the Objective of the programme, i.e., the general impact the policy might have in 
the long run. 
Keywords:  (Un)Employment, Nationals and Foreign Labour, National Labour, Nationalisation, 
Workforce, Saudization.
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Introduction 
F or the past 14 years, Saudi Arabia has been struggling to reduce its dependence on foreign labour and increase the participation of Saudi nationals in the private sector. Policies of Saudization adopted in the last twenty years have not achieved what they set out to do and fell short in com-
bating unemployment, creating jobs for the increasing numbers of Saudi job seekers, and decreasing 
dependence on foreign labour. Despite the slight increase in the percentage of Saudis employed in 
the private sector from 10.4 percent in 2011 to 14.4 percent in 2013,1 the country is still experiencing 
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the highest influx of foreign labour at any point of time2 and outgoing remittances remain one of the 
highest in the world, second only to the United States. Foreign workers are sending out over SR26.6 
billion a year and, more importantly, unemployment among Saudis remains very high.3 Considering 
these figures, this explanatory note discusses the latest Saudization scheme “Nitaqat” and evaluates it as 
a national policy. It mainly addresses three dimensions: Output of the programme; mainly planned and 
implemented activities; Outcome or what the policy achieved (intermediate policy results); and finally, 
the Objective of the programme, that is, the general impact the policy might have in the long run.    
Background
Since the early 70s, the Saudi economy has been one of the fastest growing economies in the region due 
to ample oil resources.4 To carry out the ambitious development plans and build the country’s infrastruc-
ture, the government relied on foreign workers to overcome the lack of national human resources and to 
satisfy the huge demand for labour starting with the first oil boom in the mid-seventies to the present. 
The ambitious development approach that was adopted by the government resulted in over-dependence 
on an expatriate workforce to satisfy the labour shortage in the private sector. However, policymakers 
were aware of the importance of reducing the economy’s dependence on foreign labour and increasing 
national labour market participation and therefore several initiatives were introduced to nationalise pri-
vate sector jobs.
The government addressed Saudization as early as 1969 when it drafted its Third Workers and La-
bour Law.5 Article 45 of the law stated that 75 percent of private sector workers must be Saudis and their 
wages should not be less than 51 percent of the total salaries paid; but such a decree has never been im-
plemented or enforced. A few years later, the first oil boom caused a surge in labour demand exceeding 
the available supply even in the public sector; therefore, there was no pressure to pursue the Saudization 
policy. However, the government’s attempts continued, and in 1974, it was decreed that priority should 
be granted to recruitment of Saudis when hiring in the private sector. The law was not enforced at that 
time because almost all of the Saudis were interested in working only for the public sector, and for the 
following two decades, the fast growing government sector was able to absorb the national workforce. 
It was not until the late 1980s that Saudization became a matter of concern due to the sharp increase in 
the Saudi population from 5,772 million in 1970 to 16,139 million in 1990.6 Improvement in the popu-
lation’s educational attainments and saturation in the public sector also pressured decision makers to 
pursue Saudization more vigorously. Private sector employment elasticity over the past decade was only 
1.1, leaving Saudis with no option but to wait for an opening in the public sector. Saudi nationals faced 
unemployment while the dependence on foreign labour continued. Therefore, Saudization became a pri-
ority on the policy agenda at the end of 1990s when the Saudi labour market started recording increasing 
unemployment rates among nationals, and over 90 percent of private sector employees were foreigners. 
In the late 1990s, a number of programmes and targets were launched to reach one goal, which was 
to increase the Saudi workers’ employment share in the private sector by substituting foreign workers 
with Saudis. In 1995, an annual increase of 5 percent in the employment share for Saudi nationals in all 
companies with more than 20 employees was also decreed but this aim remains far from being achieved. 
The 75 percent target was not realistic because the population was small and demand for labour was 
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extremely high as a result of the ambitious development projects of the government. The Seventh Devel-
opment Plan 2000-2005 set a more feasible target of a 25 percent Saudization rate in the private sector 
by 2002. Later, in the Eighth Development Plan, the target was increased to 30 percent.  Along with 
the quota system, many measures were decreed to expedite nationalisation efforts, such as the reserva-
tion of specific job categories for Saudis, such as security, administrative/clerical, sales, and taxi drivers. 
Visas for such occupations are not being issued.  In addition, many sanctions such as exclusion from 
government tenders and loans and a ban on labour card renewals were introduced for those who failed to 
comply with the new regulations.  However, quotas remain far from being achieved and the Saudis’ em-
ployment share in the private sector remains low at only 10.4 percent in 2010. Nationalisation strategies 
are now firmly embedded in Saudi Arabia like in all other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
to tackle present and potential unemployment problems.7 Nevertheless, results have not matched the 
level of government efforts to Saudize; when the country’s population of 27 million contains 8.4 million 
expatriates, it is safe to say that Saudization is under huge pressure to achieve better results than those 
already attained. Therefore, because of continuing pressure, in 2011 the Saudi policymakers came up 
with a new and improved programme “Nitaqat,” which was launched by the Ministry of Labour and 
enforced by the Ministry of the Interior. The programme is the focus of our discussion in this paper, 
bearing in mind that nationalisation tops the economic and political agenda of the Saudi government.
Nitaqat output
Nitaqat is a national Saudization programme designed to boost the Saudis’ share of private sector em-
ployment opportunities. The Nitaqat system evaluates private sector entities based on their nationalisa-
tion achievements and classifies them into groups, Excellent, Green, Yellow, and Red, according to their 
Saudization performance. 
As per the Nitaqat programme, companies are classified into four groups:
The Saudization rate is calculated using a moving average basis over a successive period of 26 weeks, 
with the number of Saudi workers registered with the Kingdom’s national insurance scheme (GOSI). 
Unlike previous nationalisation schemes which required a unified quota for all companies, under Nitaqat 
the size of the company and the nature of the economic activities set the minimal requirement for their 
compliance with the quota system.8 
Entities achieving an excellent 
quota performance with the highest
percentage of national recruitment    
Entities achieving a good quota
performance with a good 
percentage of nationalisation
Entities achieving below average 
performance with a low percentage 
of Saudization    
Non-compliant entities
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The Labour Ministry also claimed that the Nitaqat programme includes many other short-term 
and long-term objectives like providing more opportunities for less privileged groups such as women, 
people with special needs, and individuals born with a maternal Saudi heritage. The new scheme also 
offers greater mobility to expatriates if they are working in non-compliant companies. Saudization tar-
gets given in Table 1 are adjusted, upwards or downwards, to fit the prevailing economic situation and 
outlook. Organisations that meet their targets are given rewards with preferential treatment, mainly fa-
cilitating visa renewal for existing visas and granting/issuing new visas if desired. Classification depends 
upon the number of Saudi jobseekers demanding opportunities in that corresponding field.  Companies 
are again classified into 45 economic activities and categorized into five groups based on the number of 
their employees. The main tool of the system is visa control: suspending the privileges of issuing, renew-
ing or transferring visas for non-compliant companies and granting all privileges to those who comply. 
table 1. Nitaqat system
Under this system, the Saudization quota that the firm has to satisfy varies by industry and size. 
Economic activities are allocated into 52 different categories such as tourism, banking, communications 
and petrochemicals. Each category is divided into five groups based on number of employees, as shown 
in Table 1. Therefore, firms are distributed among 260 categories. All private entities are classified 
within each industry by size, economic activity, and the number of employees. 
Nitaqat outcome
In 2011 when Nitaqat was first introduced, the registered private sector enterprises accounted for 
1,805,875. By the end of 2012, their number had increased to 1,979,103.  Only 13 percent of the total 
firms are subject to Nitaqat, because entities operating with less than 10 employees are exempt.  The 







Micro Enterprise Exempt from Nitaqat1 - 9
Small 5 - 24%10 - 49
Medium 6 - 27%50 - 499
Large 7 - 30%500 - 2,999
Big 8 - 30%+ 3,000
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Figure 1. Distribution of private sector entities  
by Nitaqat zone in Saudi arabia 2011, 2012 
As shown in Figure 1, the share of micro enterprises which employs less than 10 people grew 
between 2011 and 2012 by 9 percent. Growth of micro enterprises is expected in a dynamic growing 
economy. However, the overall change in each category’s share reflects the result of enforcing Nitaqat. 
Private sector entities are trying to escape penalties and this is evident in the sharp decrease in the red 
zone’s share and, to a lesser degree, the yellow zone’s share too. A recent empirical study concluded that 
about 68 percent of red zone firms improved their status, with over half moving to the green or platinum 
zone.9 Moreover, almost 80 percent of the firms in the yellow zone improved their status and moved to 
a higher zone. In both categories, enterprises try to escape penalties either by reducing the number of 
employees (if they are small enterprises) or employing more Saudis. In the latter case, the outcome is 
very positive.












Source: Ministry of Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2012.
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The Saudi labour market is still dominated by foreign workers; they account for about 85.6 percent 
of the total workers in the private sector, as Table 3 shows. This represents a fall from 89 percent in 
2011. This modest improvement is a direct result of the policies that the Saudi government has adopted 
recently, including Nitaqat. However, it is important to note that the second largest proportion of for-
eign labour is not in the red or yellow zones, but in the green and white zones. Both of these are safe 
zones; the green is safe because they have an equivalent workforce share of Saudis, and the white is safe 
because firms are exempt from the previously mentioned regulations. Therefore, it is very important to 
look at the overall effect.
table 3: Distribution of Saudis and non-Saudis in the private sector by zone, 2012
Did the new programme increase the number of Saudis in private sector employment? Table 4 
shows the composition of the workforce by nationality and gender. It shows that the Saudi males’ share 
in employment, increased in one year by 23.3 percent; on the other hand, there was an increase in for-
eign male workers but to a lesser degree of 6.16 percent. Combining that with another indicator, which 
is the number of issued visas for the same period, a noticeable increase can be seen in the number of 
expatriate workers. The approved visas increased by 33 percent in 2012 as compared to 2011, and the 
Ministry of Labour explained that the increase was due to a high demand for labour in construction 
projects (visas issued to the construction sector alone increased by 51 percent, compared to the visas is-
sued in 2011).  Therefore, it seems that the substitution of foreign workers did not take place. Instead, 
more Saudis were employed to satisfy the requirements and more foreigners were used to do the work, 
especially in sectors that depend heavily on foreign labour such as construction.  The easy availability of 
cheap, low skilled foreign labour made this sector unattractive to Saudis. 
The data given in Table 4 shows a noticeable increase (almost 117 percent) in the number of Saudi 
women employed in the private sector. There were a number of reasons for this increase assuming the 
reliability of the data and the actual employment of these women as opposed to “phantom Saudiza-
tion.”10 The increase is due mainly to the large number of Saudi women willing to work,11  in line with 
the set of policies and regulations that the Ministry of Labour has implemented to “feminize” a number 
of retail sales jobs and suitable industrial jobs, and, more importantly, the generous support provided by 












Source: Ministry of Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2012.
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in the non-Saudi females share in employment by -4.21 percent reflects a substitution effect (by Saudi 
females) especially in retail sales jobs.
table 4: private sector registered employees by nationality 2011-2012
The data given previously demonstrates an increase in the number of Saudis being employed fol-
lowing the implementation of Nitaqat. Demand for Saudis went up immediately after the implementa-
tion of the programme especially as companies sought to avoid non-compliance penalties. The wages for 
Saudi workers have also gone up by 7.5 percent.12 Some of this is probably the outcome of regulatory 
pressure and sanctions from the government. Some of it, however, is attributed to the increasing cost 
of living in the course of the high fiscal spending.13 To sustain the increase in wages, nationalisation 
schemes must not ignore the existing market segmentation and must facilitate and enforce market 
mechanisms, especially employment based on productivity. Nitaqat has increased Saudi employment as 
data shows, but such results also come at a heavy cost. A recent empirical evaluation of the programme 
concluded that the compliance rates were very high.14 Firms hired an additional 96,000 Saudi workers 
over an initial period of 16 months, but the programme also caused approximately 11,000 firms to close 
down, raising the exit rate by nearly 50 per cent. The programme also brought down total employment 
numbers among surviving firms, and overall private sector employment declined by 418,000 workers. 
However, correction measures are expected to have some negative impact in the short term.
Discussion
The focus of our discussion is on whether or not the programme’s targets have been achieved. Firstly, the 
new programme addressed some shortcomings of previous nationalisation schemes, especially at the op-
erational level. It abandoned the blanket quotas of Saudization in different sectors and occupations and 
adopted more flexible quotas based on needs and demands. One important target of this programme is 
to increase the employment share of Saudis in the private sector, and it actually did help in this regard, 
especially in relation to female employment. Many argue that Nitaqat is constructed around a very 
contradictory philosophy: it aims at rationalising the use of foreign labour to ensure more opportunities 
for Saudis, yet its incentive system facilitates the use of more foreign labour15 as compliant companies 
are granted more visas to hire more foreign labour.16 Another shortcoming of Nitaqat is revealed by the 
fact that 87 percent of the private sector enterprises employ a quarter of the foreign labour; more than 
two million foreign employees are employed by firms in the white zone which are exempt from Nitaqat. 








Source: Ministry of Labour Statistical Yearbook, 2012.
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cape the Saudization requirement and that undermines the effectiveness of the programme in reducing 
dependence on foreign labour and increasing opportunities for Saudis. On the other hand, the business 
community is concerned that in the absence of qualified and skilled employees, the productivity of the 
business and industrial sector might be undermined. This, in my opinion, is a short-term effect and busi-
ness could adjust in the long term if nationalisation programmes tackle the supply and demand issues. 
Recent evaluations of Nitaqat’s impact on increasing the Saudi nationals’ share of private sector jobs has 
not been positive17 as it showed that the share of the nationals in private sector employment increased at 
a very modest rate. Also, the implementation of Nitaqat has been very difficult, and the programme has 
had only a modest impact so far in boosting private sector employment and reducing foreign depend-
ence.18  
The modest effects recorded so far, despite the government’s long term commitment to Saudiza-
tion, are a result of the failure to tackle the issue comprehensively.  The schemes adopted were not, 
and are still not, part of a strategic process where all government policies are aligned and synergized to 
reach a common goal and where all stakeholders are involved. Nationalisation still faces two obstacles: 
first, it obligates the private sector to employ more Saudis but has no means of motivating nationals to 
participate actively in the private sector, especially considering the ongoing competition from the gov-
ernment sector.  Then, the growing wage disparity and the expansion in government recruitment further 
intensifies the preference for government sector jobs.19 Government investment decisions have a long 
term impact on employability. In recent years, growth in Saudi Arabia has been driven by government 
spending on large infrastructure projects which in turn is facilitated by easy access to low wage foreign 
labour. Consequently, sectors such as construction and general services have been the main engine of 
private sector growth.20 However, these sectors have not contributed to an increase in Saudi employ-
ment and are not expected to do so in the future because of the low wage levels and low skill require-
ment. Therefore, strategic investment decisions should take into account employability implication on 
local human resources and the level of required skills. Nitaqat cannot stand alone and have an optimal 
impact without the necessary changes being made to the labour market eco-systems. This would also 
mean focusing on administrative intervention rather than on market mechanisms, which would then 
pose major constraints to an effective labour policy. 
Like all previous programmes and initiatives, Nitaqat has had some degree of success as discussed 
previously but has also brought along significant costs and inefficiencies that a market-oriented policy 
could have minimised.  In addition, quotas and occupational bans, such as Nitaqat, are policies of micro-
management, which demand a monitoring capability that is beyond even the most modern of bureaucra-
cies.21 They create incentives for manipulation, fake employment, and corruption. Inspection capacities 
have been criticised as insufficient on the basis that bureaucratic discretion reduces the legal security of 
business and creates opportunities for corruption. Labour offices have limited information about the 
actual needs and structures of the hundreds of thousands of businesses operating in the Kingdom, which 
can result in misallocation of visas and Saudization requirements. The Ministry of Labour claimed that 
its new controlling body for labour inspections will significantly increase its monitoring capabilities, 
but this remains to be seen as the policy is still in a transition stage and requires more monitoring and 
evaluation.
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Conclusion
The paper provides an overview of the current progress towards Saudization. Nationalisation policies 
are proceeding briskly as labour markets undergo huge adjustments driven by demographic changes in 
the Kingdom, along with an improvement in the quality and quantity of the local labour supply. How-
ever, for policies to be successfully implemented, active coordination between the government and the 
private sector is required. Therefore, we can draw two broad but related conclusions: on the supply side, 
there is an ample pool of skilled Saudi labour, but there is still a mismatch between supply and demand 
that needs to be addressed by introducing complementary policies beyond Nitaqat. On the demand 
side, the segmented labour market still exists and the Nitaqat programme actually further reinforces 
the segmentation by creating a bigger gap between Saudi and non-Saudi salaries as a result of which 
private employers are expected to favour expatriates because of their lower wages. Quantitative measures 
of nationalisation might encourage an increase in phantom Saudization.  Expatriate labour continues 
to be vital to support certain sectors such as construction and localising these sectors is neither possible 
nor advisable.22 This situation is compounded by conflicting government strategies, influencing both 
supply and demand. For example, the expansion in higher education institutions push youth away from 
vocational training, further widening the skills gap in the long run. Besides, the government has initi-
ated an expansion in public sector recruitment to ease social and political pressures. If these two issues 
are addressed, a sustainable outcome and positive progress in the nationalisation process is expected. In 
the long term, effective nationalisation policies require structural reform in many areas, including coor-
dination and synergy between labour policies and macroeconomic policies, addressing nationalisation 
concerns when making strategic investment decisions, and modifying the prevailing social contract.23  
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